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TAKING THE LEGISLATIVE TEMPERATURE: 
WHICH FEDERAL CLIMATE CHANGE 
LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL IS “BEST”? 
Victor B. Flatt∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
The United States will almost certainly enact federal legislation de-
signed to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases within the next two years.  
It is uncertain what final form this legislation will take and what variables 
will be in play in the discussion.  At this stage, even the ultimate target in 
greenhouse gas reductions is not yet known.  The legislation could have 
economy-wide effects, or could only affect certain industries.  It might al-
low the use of offsets or not.  It may integrate with existing pollution-
control regimes or stand on its own.  It will likely create new wealth for cer-
tain segments of the economy, but may put others out of business.  How 
these and other policy choices are resolved could turn out to be the most 
important legislative question that our country addresses in the foreseeable 
future.1 
As of October 17, 2007, there were at least ten legislative proposals in 
Congress that address climate change.2  As identified by their primary spon-
 ∗  A.L. O’Quinn Chair in Environmental Law, and director of the Environment, Energy, and Natural 
Resources Center, the University of Houston Law Center.  The author would like to thank Marcilynn 
Burke, Charles Irvine, and Carol Rose for comments on earlier iterations of this document.  Thanks to 
Environment & Energy Daily and Michael Witt for their permission to hyperlink to several Environment 
& Energy Daily articles.  Additionally, an article such as this dealing with a fast-moving target could not 
exist without the commitment of the Northwestern University Law Review to putting forth scholarly dia-
logue in the new Northwestern University Law Review Colloquy.  Special thanks to the dedicated fast 
and thorough work of the students associated with the Colloquy, especially Isaac Peterson and Melissa 
Whitehead.  Finally, a special thank you to John O’Quinn Foundation for endowing the A. L. O’Quinn 
Chair in Environmental Law, which make this scholarship possible. 
1  The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the value of carbon allocations in a U.S. cap and 
trade system could approach hundreds of billions of dollars.  See TERRY DINAN, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, 
TRADE-OFFS IN ALLOCATING ALLOWANCES FOR CO2 EMISSIONS 1 (2007), 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdoc.cfm?index=8027&type=1 (link).  The cost of avoided harm by controlling 
climate change is more uncertain, but has been estimated in the trillions.  Robert Peston, Report’s Stark 
Warning on Climate, BBC NEWS, Oct. 29, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6096594.stm 
(link). 
2  See Resources for the Future, July 2007 Climate Change Bills in Congress, 
www.rff.org/climatechangelegislation (Oct. 31, 2007) (link) [hereinafter July 2007 Climate Change 
Bills]; RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, SUMMARY OF MARKET-BASED CLIMATE CHANGE BILLS 
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sors, these include Bingaman-Specter, Udall-Petri, Lieberman-McCain, 
Kerry-Snowe, Waxman, Sanders-Boxer, Feinstein-Carper, Alexander-
Lieberman, Stark, and Larson.  In addition, other politicians, such as John 
Dingell, have announced “plans” for legislation, announced their own goals 
for climate change, and/or endorsed various components of the filed bills.3  
Although there has been politicking on both sides of this issue, we have not 
yet defined a suitable framework for evaluating the legislation.  In the case 
of climate change, it is particularly difficult to come up with a workable 
framework because of the scope and unusual complexity of the issue.  In 
fact, because of its connection to so many different parts of the economy, 
the impact of climate change regulation is present in issues not necessarily 
characterized as climate change, such as automobile efficiency and other 
energy legislation.  Nevertheless, the more comprehensively we address 
climate change, the better.4 
It may seem difficult to propose a framework to judge the effectiveness 
of climate change proposals when there is no agreement on the standards 
with which we judge legislation generally.5  Our legislative process is not 
transparent, which increases the likelihood of rent seeking6 and renders it 
                                                                                                                           
INTRODUCED IN THE 110TH CONGRESS (2007), 
http://www.rff.org/rff/News/Releases/2007Releases/July2007ClimateChangeBillsinCongress.cfm (fol-
low “Summary of Climate Change Bills Introduced in the 110th Congress” hyperlink) (link) [hereinafter 
SUMMARY OF BILLS] (mentioning the Udall-Petri bill, which is a draft that has not been introduced but 
retains elements of prior Udall and Petri bills in the 109th Congress; discussion of this bill is based on an 
analysis of what is currently expected to be proposed).  A specific date is noted due to ongoing altera-
tions in proposed legislation.  Legislation cited in this essay refer to the bills in their form as of October 
17, 2007. 
3  See Darren Samuelsohn, Democratic Leaders Want ‘Strong Bill’ on Global Warming, Waxman 
Says, ENV’T & ENERGY DAILY, Mar. 21, 2007 (link). 
4  See Darren Samuelsohn & Ben Geman, Boucher Would Delay Energy Conference  
for Cap-and-Trade Package, ENV’T & ENERGY DAILY, Sept. 7, 2007 (noting that Boucher argues that 
combining climate change legislation with energy legislation into one package is optimal) (link). 
5  The mechanics of legislation are well known.  Why laws take a particular form is far more diffi-
cult to exactly explain or predict.  “Public choice” theory, one of the dominant theories of legislation, 
has been explained by Professor Edward Rubin: 
Public Choice analysis has recently emerged as a leading approach to the study of the legislative 
process.  Its grim landscape of vote-maximizing legislators, rent-seeking interest groups, budget-
aggrandizing bureaucrats, and free-riding citizens has now become familiar territory.  Proponents 
of public choice assert that it constitutes a comprehensive theory, and they level the dread charge 
of idealism and naïveté against those who seek broader vistas and more cheerful prospects. 
Edward L. Rubin, Beyond Public Choice: Comprehensive Rationality in the Writing and Reading of 
Statutes, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1991).  He goes on to explain the theoretical bases behind public 
choice, noting that its tenets should spring from the assumption that “all political participants are ra-
tional, egoistic utility maximizers,” which he claims is not in the public interest.  Id. at 5.  This can be 
contrasted with those who view individual utility maximizers as simply the best way to get to over all 
societal welfare, as measured by Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.  See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Legislation, 
Well-Being, and Public Choice, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 63, 64 (1990). 
6   “Rent seeking” is when persons seek to capture all benefits produced by efficiencies of the market 
or legislation for themselves.  For instance, if a new law will increase the market value of a product, to 
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difficult to hold the normative discussions necessary to inform the public so 
that it can demand the particular kinds of consideration it desires.  Political 
power-games add another dimension that makes the discussion even more 
complex.7 
I will not attempt to devise a comprehensive framework with which to 
analyze the desirability of all legislation.  But with respect to climate 
change, there are certain policy choices that must be debated.  An analysis 
of these policy choices and their importance creates a common framework 
for discussion.  We may not all agree that rising temperatures in Alaska are 
bad, but knowing the outcome of a particular policy choice provides a basis 
for understanding the popular will and opinion regarding the choice.8  
Therefore, this Colloquy Essay specifies: 1) the most important policy 
choices at stake in climate change legislation, 2) why they are important, 3) 
the best resolution of these issues, and 4) how the current legislative pro-
posals deal with them. 
Legislation is a dynamic and iterative process.  The legislative propos-
als analyzed in this Essay may be dropped or changed and other legislation 
may be proposed before comprehensive climate change legislation is 
passed.9  Indeed, this Essay and the comments that follow will hopefully 
provide impetus for changing legislative proposals in response to a consid-
eration of issues herein.  Nevertheless, the scientific underpinnings of cli-
mate change, including the range of remaining uncertainties, are well 
enough understood that the analytical principles associated with climate 
change issues will not change in the immediate future.  Therefore, the 
analysis of the policy choices herein should inform any forthcoming climate 
change legislation and also serve as a resource for examining inevitable 
shortcomings and possible amendments in climate change legislation of the 
future. 
This analysis is divided into two parts.  The first part will analyze the 
goals or purposes of climate change legislation, and the second part will 
                                                                                                                           
“rent seek” would be to try and steer the legislation so that the rent seeker would receive the greatest 
percentage of the increase in value. 
7  No one could have watched the Senate hearings on climate change featuring testy exchanges be-
tween former Vice-President Al Gore and Senator James Inhofe, or hear newspaper commentators refer 
derisively to “Al Gore’s movie,” without realizing that personal egos, likes, and dislikes may play at 
least as large a role as dispassionate science in what climate change legislation the United States passes.  
See, e.g., CNN: Boxer Tells Inhofe Who the Boss is Now, a http://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=UWpkBcWsAME (last visited on Dec. 1, 2007) (link). 
8  While I hesitate to bring up another variable, it is also important to note how information can 
change preferences or even persuade them (which is the basis of advertising).  Government has even 
used this as an overt policy tool, usually by the moniker of “information and education.”  But if this is a 
possible result of transparency, it too can be transparent and be considered in the choice itself. 
9  On October 16, 2007, it was announced that Senators Lieberman and Warner would propose a bill 
that would alter two key areas in prior legislation and ideas floated by the two senators.  See Darren 
Samuelsohn, Lieberman-Warner Plan Tightens Emissions Cap, Limits Credits, GREENWIRE, Oct. 16, 
2007 (link). 
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look at the policy choices associated with reaching these goals.10  The 
method of accomplishing these goals would be considered “best” if it 
reaches and accomplishes all of the goals in the most efficient way possi-
ble.11 
I. WHAT IS THE GOAL OF CLIMATE CHANGE LEGISLATION? 
To a casual observer, the goal of climate change legislation might seem 
to be simple—to stop climate change.  But one quickly sees that expense, 
cost allocation, and harm distribution are equally important.  Moreover, 
some amount of climate change might be tolerable or even preferred by cer-
tain groups.  Without properly determining goals at this step, these choices 
will be made at another time, with high transaction costs due either to in-
complete information or failure to determine goals.12  Furthermore, the fail-
ure to identify explicit goals may work in favor of some interest groups who 
can exploit this opacity to address other issues sub rosa.13 
A. What Climate Change Effects are we Trying to Avoid? 
A climate change legislative goal must, at a minimum, address the 
harmful effects that it seeks to avoid—the “effects target.”  An effects target 
will guide how much we want to avoid temperature rise and other associ-
ated effects of climate change.  This goal must also specify how that change 
can be translated into actual reductions of carbon dioxide (“CO2”) or other 
gases that affect climate change.  This requires us to determine how much 
harm we are willing to endure, whose harm we are concerned about, and 
how much we are willing to pay to avoid this harm. 
Because CO2 is the primary gas that contributes to the greenhouse ef-
fect, which is driving a rise in temperatures and other associated climate 
change effects, most discussion of climate change avoidance has focused, 
 
10  Separating out the discussion of goals and ways of reaching the goals helps clarify the issues and 
avoid the masking of goal choices as policy implementation choices.  See Victor B. Flatt, Saving the 
Lost Sheep: Bringing Environmental Values Back into the Fold with a New EPA Decisionmaking Para-
digm, 74 WASH. L. REV. 1, 20 (1999). 
11  Note this statement is only true if all true goals are included and are addressed.  For instance, with 
climate change, while the main goal may be to reduce CO2 emissions, another goal may be to do so in a 
way that is fair or that does not impose costs on the poor.  It is only with respect to all goals that we can 
use the term “efficient.”  Efficiency in CO2 reductions alone might run counter to other goals that are 
important.  See Victor B. Flatt, Should the Circle be Unbroken?, 24 ENVTL. L. 1707, 1713 (1994) (re-
viewing STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION 
(1993)) (“[A]ctual policy choices [may] reflect societal values other than the explicit reduction of risk to 
human life.”). 
12  See Flatt, supra note 10, at 20. 
13  For instance, if there is concern about other air pollutants in addition to carbon dioxide, a push to 
eliminate all other anthropogenic greenhouse gases could be made for purposes of other kinds of health 
protection.  This may not be a bad thing per se, but without an explicit policy goal it is hard to evaluate 
whether the resulting policy is a good one. 
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since its inception, on the amount of annual reductions in the emission of 
CO2 (and CO2 equivalents)14 that we will need to avoid the harms that are 
associated with climate change.  The Rio Framework on Climate Change 
and the later Kyoto protocol focused on the reductions in CO2 emissions of 
industrialized countries in a relatively short time frame, as a first step to-
wards later reductions.15  Recent new targets in reductions have been pro-
posed and offered by countries around the world as the next step in fighting 
climate change.16 
However, the apparent simplicity of such percentage-gauged reduc-
tions masks huge complications in estimating the actual effects of these re-
ductions.  A reduction in atmospheric CO2 lags the greenhouse effects of 
the gas by forty years or more, meaning that temperatures will rise even if 
all greenhouse gas emissions were stopped now.17  Reductions in one juris-
diction must be compared to reductions or increases in others to ascertain 
the worldwide reductions that will occur.  Moreover, targets may not trans-
late into actual reductions.  With these caveats, however, there is some sci-
entific consensus about the effects of CO2 concentrations on temperature 
change and associated climate change effects.  Moreover, there is some 
consensus on what reductions from historic emissions must occur world-
wide to avoid the worst climate change harms. 
Current CO2 concentrations are at about 377 parts per million (ppm) 
(higher than pre-industrial levels by 40%) and projections indicate that CO2 
concentrations will grow by between 63% to 235% by 2050, depending on 
programs to reduce CO2.18  There is consensus that if average global 
 
14  CO2 provides about 70% of the heat retention associated with the anthropogenic greenhouse ef-
fects at play in the Earth’s atmosphere.  Other gases such as methane, water vapor, and HCFCs also 
have greenhouse forcing capabilities.  Generally, when greenhouse gas amelioration is discussed, it is 
done with respect to CO2 reductions.  Nevertheless, it is clearly recognized that reductions in other 
greenhouse gases may have the same effect as a different amount of CO2 reduction, and therefore many 
discussion of greenhouse gas reductions are in terms of CO2 or amounts of other gases that would be 
equivalent to an amount of CO2 reduction.  These equivalent gases are very important in any climate 
change legislation and will be considered explicitly, infra Part II.  However, for ease of discussion I will 
drop the parenthetical regarding CO2 equivalents, and one should assume that discussion of CO2 reduc-
tions may include reduction of other gases that can be equated to CO2 reductions. 
15  See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 10, 
1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.html (link). 
16  See, e.g., The EU’s Contribution to Shaping a Future Global Climate Change Regime, 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/future_action.htm (link) (last visited Nov. 16, 2007); Darren 
Samuelsohn, Congress Has Its Eye on Int’l Warming Talks, ENV’T & ENERGY DAILY, Sept. 24, 2007 
(link). 
17  See SIR NICHOLAS STERN, STERN REVIEW ON THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 11–13 
(2006), http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/3/6/Chapter_1_The_Science_of_Climate_Change.pdf 
(link).  Although many of the economic assumptions of the Stern Report have been criticized and chal-
lenged, its discussion of the scientific basis of climate change and the effects resulting from that are 
widely accepted). 
18  See T.J. Blasing & Carmen Smith, Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center, Recent Green-
house Gas Concentrations (July 2006), http://cdiac.ornl.gov/pns/current_ghg.html (link); KEVIN 
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warming is kept lower than two degrees Celsuis, the effects of that 
temperture rise, while harmful, would not be catastrophic.19  There is also 
consensus that CO2 emissions must be reduced by 50–80% of 1990 CO2 
production levels to achieve this lower level of warming.20 
It is from these scientific analyses that we choose reduction targets, 
and it is with these scientific analyses that we compare our choices.  The 
variance of legislative CO2 reduction targets result from the uncertainty in 
the science of these predictions, the degree of warming that is acceptable 
(with respect to the entire world, a nation, or some identified group), the 
technological changes that may exist in the future to address energy produc-
tion or climate change harms, and the costs a given jurisdiction is willing to 
accept.  While uncertainty exists as to the effects of average temperature 
rise, most nations have embraced the notion that reductions in annual output 
of CO2 must be made to stabilize the atmospheric concentrations at a level 
to keep average global temperature rise under two degrees Celsius. 
In keeping with the above consensus, most of the legislative proposals 
analyzed in this Essay target a temperature rise no greater than two degrees 
Celcius (3.8 degrees Fahrenheit).  Most then translate this temperature rise 
limitation into goals for reductions in annual CO2 emissions21  Nine of the 
current legislative proposals—Bingaman-Specter, Udall-Petri, Lieberman-
McCain, Kerry-Snowe, Sanders-Boxer, Waxman, Feinstein-Carper, Alex-
ander-Lieberman, and Stark—include either CO2 reduction targets or esti-
mates of CO2 reductions in a specified time frame.22  The reductions are 
made in comparison to historical emissions data and are at least theoreti-
cally designed to limit all or most U.S. emissions by this percentage in the 
time frame specified.23  The Larson proposal, one of the tax proposals,24 
does not reference a specified reduction goal in greenhouse gas emissions. 
                                                                                                                           
BAUMART ET AL., PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE DATA: INSIGHTS AND 
OBSERVATIONS 15 (2004), http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/Climate%20Data%20new.pdf 
(link). 
19  Raymond Colitt, World Must Fix Climate in Less than 10 Years, REUTERS, Nov. 27, 2007, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN19489506._CH_.2400 (link).  The irreversible melting of the 
Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets is considered catastrophic and may occur with temperature rise 
above two degrees Celsius.  Other impacts have also been described as catastrophic. 
20  PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 101: THE SCIENCE AND IMPACTS 
7 (2007), http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/101_Science_Impacts.pdf (link). 
21  See, e.g., Global Warming Pollution Reduction Act, S. 309, 110th Cong. (2007), available at 
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_bills&docid=f:s309is.txt (link). 
22  See SUMMARY OF BILLS, supra note 2. 
23  Id. The legislative proposals very in what percentage of sources the CO2 emissions reductions 
will apply to.  The Lieberman-Warner proposal will only affect 80% of US CO2 sources, and doesn’t 
cover residential or commercial buildings, or the agricultural sector.  See Samuelsohn, supra note 9.  
Similarly, the current legislative proposals do not address all CO2 or other greenhouse gas reductions 
despite many being touted as economy wide. 
24 See infra Part II. 
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Most of the economy-wide CO2 reductions target at least a 50% reduc-
tion in CO2 from 1990 levels by mid-century, though there are some out-
liers.25  The largest reduction, 80%, is anticipated to come from the 
Waxman and Boxer-Sanders proposals.26 
While each of the proposed statutes reference the importance of avoid-
ing climate change harm, these percentage reductions are not defined with 
respect to what variables could affect such a choice, such as what commu-
nity is considered, the allocation of costs and benefits, and the expectations 
of other reductions or future technological changes or solutions.  From the 
press releases of the legislative sponsors, it appears that all believe that their 
reductions are just enough to avoid the worst harm, while inflicting minimal 
damage on the economy.  Though these “Goldilocks” targets all claim to be 
“just right,” they lack valid supporting studies that prove these targets ac-
complish the climate change mitigation that the legislative sponsors claim.  
Even the scientists themselves may not be sure of the probability of tem-
perature rise associated with certain reductions or the distribution and ef-
fects of that rise, but failure to be more specific leaves the focus on direct 
economic impacts to the detriment of the other concerns. 
Moreover, detailing what sectors the percentage reductions cover may 
be critical; lack of reductions in certain areas will reduce the supposed 
overall reduction and thus the possibility of avoiding the worst climate 
change harms.  Thus, bills that target a 50% reduction in CO2 from 1990 
levels by mid-century, which are qualified by exceptions, such as the Lie-
berman-McCain proposal, may be less “costly” to the economy in one 
sense.  However, the costs associated with too many exceptions means that 
such a bill may in fact be more costly to our society and economy in the 
long run than the Waxman or Boxer-Sanders bills, which target an 80% re-
duction in CO2 from 1990 levels by mid-century.  As proposed in the 
Boxer-Sanders legislation, it is possible to revisit reduction targets as new 
scientific information comes in, but this same strategy has not worked well 
in revisiting human health effects and residual risk in the Clean Air Act’s 
control of hazardous air pollutants.27 
B. Whom Are We Trying to Protect? 
To analyze whether the legislative goals are sufficient, we must also 
know whom the legislation intends to protect.  Whether our legislation 
seeks to avoid the worst harms only in this country or works to prevent 
 
25  Direct comparison is difficult in the text since some proposals refer to reductions from CO2 
amounts produced in years other than 1990.  Note also that some sectors may not be covered.  A graphi-
cal representation that takes some of this into account has been published by Resources for the Future, 
comparing reductions across proposals.  See SUMMARY OF BILLS, supra note 2. 
26  Id. 
27  Victor B. Flatt, Gasping for Breath: The Administrative Flaws of Federal Hazardous Air Pollu-
tion Regulation and What We Can Learn from the States, 34 ECOLOGY L. Q. 107, 118 (2007). 
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them worldwide is an important consideration.  The U.S. will probably suf-
fer fewer effects from climate change than many equatorial countries, and 
because it is a developed country, it may have the resources to mitigate 
some of the worst harms.  But, that does not mean that only purely domestic 
considerations should underlie any climate change legislation.  Addressing 
whether our goals of climate change reduction and mitigation extend 
worldwide is important both practically and morally. 
Practically speaking, failure to set goals which reflect the interests of 
other countries means that our ability to control domestic impacts is less-
ened.  The Bush Administration’s approach to climate change, which fo-
cuses almost exclusively on the U.S., has drawn criticism and potential non-
cooperation from developing countries.28  Without controls on greenhouse 
gas production in developing countries, the U.S.’s best efforts at avoiding 
harm may be undermined by the failure of other countries to take action. 
This practical concern in turn inevitably brings up issues of social jus-
tice and fairness since the lack of consideration of such issues by the U.S. 
and other developed nations is ostensibly the biggest barrier to developing 
country cooperation in any worldwide system.29  The European Union, 
which is similar to the U.S. in terms of government, economics, and market, 
recognizes this.  When imposing internal climate change regulations, the 
E.U. is careful to note its historic contribution and world-wide responsibil-
ity to take action to reduce harms, aside from effects they currently feel or 
will feel in the future.30  Most international discussions about climate 
change regulation are likewise about responsibility to the world as a 
whole.31  Unless we wish our legislative efforts in climate change to come 
to naught, we must adopt this stance.  The explicit acknowledgement of this 
goal also simplifies many other policy issues. 
First, the ultimate question becomes what the “fair” share of reductions 
should be, not what an overall reduction that is equivalent from country to 
 
28  Up to this time, the U.S. response to climate change has exclusively focused on the effects to the 
U.S.  President Bush’s first climate change initiatives focused on adapting to climate change harm, 
rather than mitigating future harm, under the assumption that it was less costly to adjust to the upcoming 
higher temperatures than to prevent them coming, at least as far as the United States was concerned.  
Andrew C. Revkin, Climate Talks Shift Focus to How to Adapt to Changes, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2002, 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/envronmt/2002/1103delhi.htm (link).  One of the proffered rea-
sons for not acceding to the Kyoto protocol, given by President Bush, is that it did not set binding limits 
on developing countries. Eric Pianin, U.S. Aims to Pull out of Global Warming Treaty, ALBANY TIMES 
UNION, Mar. 28, 2001 at A3.  
29  See, e.g., Greenland Growing Season Extended Due to Warming/Indonesian President Asks 
Other Developing Nations to Press Developed World Over Emissions, GREENWIRE, Oct. 29, 2007 (link) 
[hereinafter Greenland Growing Season]. 
30  See Statement by Ambassador John Bruton on Climate Change, No. 17/05 (Feb. 16, 2005), avail-
able at http://www.eurunion.org/news/press/2005/2005017.htm (link). 
31  See European Commission President Barroso’s Remarks at the UN High Level  
Meeting on Climate Change, No. 99/07 (Sept. 24, 2007), available at 
http://www.eurunion.org/News/press/2007/2007099.htm (link). 
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country should be.  The question of whether legislation should avoid man-
datory domestic CO2 cuts until there are commitments from developing 
countries almost disappears.  As long as we are producing over four times 
the per capita CO2 output as China, it might not matter if the Chinese total 
exceeds that of the U.S.  Even if our production per capita were equal to 
China’s, the historic CO2 contributions stemming from earlier U.S. eco-
nomic growth, and the benefit we retain from that growth, may imply that 
we should allow other countries to follow a similar development mecha-
nism or that we should bear a disproportionate burden in the cost of reduc-
tion. 
Additionally, the CO2 growth in other countries may be indirectly con-
nected to our own benefit and economic growth.  Our market is the largest 
in the world and is the ultimate destination of many Chinese goods whose 
manufacture is driving much of the CO2 growth in China.  Putting a tariff or 
limits on goods made in countries without binding CO2 controls, as pro-
posed by the Bingaman-Specter and Udall-Petri legislation, is one method 
of addressing the U.S. market’s role in climate change, but not necessarily 
the best one. 
The most effective way to be in congruence with climate change con-
cerns and efforts by other countries is to set a domestic legislative reduction 
target based on international agreement.  The Kyoto Protocol was not meant 
to be the final agreement in climate change control, since its anticipated re-
ductions only buy time before other reductions are required.  There is an in-
creasing push right now for agreement on second generation reductions, and 
the framework for a new protocol is expected to be established in Bali in 
December.32  Any such agreement will grapple with the overall worldwide 
target reduction and how that reduction should be allocated between the de-
veloping world and the developed world.  The most recent meeting of coun-
tries on the issue included proposals for a 50% cut from current emission 
levels to a 50% cut from 1990 levels (representing greater reductions), and 
also addressed the need for binding reductions in developing countries.33  
While the expected disagreements materialized, some consensus on reduc-
tions and addressing the role of developing countries gives hope that this 
forum can provide for consideration of international as well as domestic in-
terests.34 
A possible successor to the Kyoto Protocol that sets binding targets for 
all countries, even if the targets are lower for developing countries, would 
 
32  Dean Scott & Mike Ferullo, Meeting of Major Economies Concludes with Countries Divided on 
Emissions Goal, [2007] Daily Env’t Rep. (BNA) No. 189 (Oct. 1, 2007); Press Release, General As-
sembly, Actions on Climate Change Will Define Global Legacy Left for Future Generations, Says Sec-
retary-General, As High-Level Event Continues, U.N. Doc. GA/10618 (Sept. 24, 2007), 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/ga10618.doc.htm (link) [hereinafter Actions on Climate 
Change]. 
33  Actions on Climate Change, supra note 32. 
34  Id. 
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ensure that all signatory countries have agreed on how much reduction is 
needed, who bears the responsibility for the cost of the reductions, and that 
the protection is worldwide.  International compliance with such a shared 
agreement is more likely, meaning that U.S. efforts will not be dragged 
down by lack of action in other countries.  In order for legislation to pro-
ceed while international discussions are still ongoing, a reduction target that 
accommodates current international goals and proposals should be used.  
Current international discussions about the relative roles of the developed 
and developing countries in reducing the effects of climate change suggest 
that the U.S. (and the E.U.) may need to take a higher share of reductions 
than developing countries.35  Thus, domestic legislation that either ac-
knowledges this fact or implicitly targets a range that could be seen as ac-
commodating international agreement is best.  This takes into account some 
international responsibility and is more congruent with an expected interna-
tional outcome. 
Many of the legislative proposals note the U.S. share of international 
emissions compared to its share of world population, and two of the pro-
posals (Kerry-Snowe and Waxman, which are similar in tone) acknowledge 
the need for international agreement on climate change.  The only other dis-
cussion of the relationship between U.S. CO2 reductions and the rest of the 
world are in the context of whether the current proposals should require 
CO2 reductions in developing countries, or whether they should protect the 
competiveness of American businesses.36 
None of the proposals specify what factors should govern the relation-
ship of U.S. emissions to other countries. The expected CO2 reductions in 
some of the U.S. legislative proposals (such as the Waxman and Boxer-
Sanders proposals) are in agreement with the emission cuts called for by the 
E.U. in the new international discussions, which indicate that international 
protection my be part of the overall goal in some of these proposals.  How-
ever, this goal should be made more specific as it lets the American public 
understand what tradeoffs are being made, and also allows for ease in future 
climate change legislation targets as more information about worldwide ef-
fects becomes available.  There may be no “right” answer regarding the 
burden our country should shoulder for international responsibilities, but 
failure to consider and discuss this will hamper the effectiveness of any leg-
islative efforts. 
C. Should Compensation be a Legislative Goal? 
Our measure of responsibility for harm is related to the question of 
whether we should assist individuals dealing with adapting to existing harm 
 
35  See Greenland Growing Season, supra note 29. 
36  See, e.g., Darren Samuelsohn, Coleman Signs on to Cap-and-Trade Plan, ENV’T & ENERGY 
DAILY, May 22, 2007, (discussing the possibility of reviewing legislation if other countries do not sign 
on or if poverty and unemployment increase) (link). 
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and expected future harm.  Climate change has arguably already caused 
harm to a large group of persons, both within our own country and else-
where. 
Many tort suits have been filed seeking redress for such harms, but the 
chance of success at this time seems small.37  The fact that climate change 
harms are not best dealt with under traditional tort systems prompts whether 
federal legislation should have a compensation system as one of its goals.  
With respect to other situations wherein tort recovery was difficult because 
of the complexity of environmental harms, federal legislation has inter-
vened in two distinct ways.  With respect to hazardous waste, the Compre-
hensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act 
(“CERCLA”) provided recovery of damages to natural resources but did 
not provide compensation for prior impacts to human health.38  However, it 
did not preclude common law actions for damages to persons.39  On the 
other hand, compensation for human health impacts were implemented for 
black lung disease and considered, but never implemented for asbestosis.40 
This suggests two possible routes to alleviate existing climate change 
harms.  In this instance, climate change is more like hazardous waste expo-
sure than black lung disease.  Those exposed to black lung were an easily 
identifiable group, and causation could be easily established, making com-
pensation for human health harms feasible.  Harm from hazardous waste 
has been more difficult to prove and entangled with other issues, just as 
climate change has been.  Thus, federal legislation should not seek to legis-
latively compensate persons or institutions that have been harmed by cli-
mate change.  This is a practical consideration rather than a moral one.  
Where causation is difficult to prove, federal legislation will not help in 
awarding damages.  Where causation is more evident, traditional tort law 
can step in to assist in compensation. 
The examples of hazardous waste and black lung suggest a different 
approach for future harms, however.  In both hazardous waste and black 
lung instances, future harm was essentially completely dealt with because 
of the related remedial measures for clean-up and abatement that had al-
ready occurred with respect to the issue.  Climate change is different.  Most 
harm has yet to occur, and no legislative action can completely remediate 
all possible future harm.  Nevertheless, legislation can authorize funds to 
 
37  The high profile California suit against auto manufacturers was recently thrown out, but many 
other possibilities remain.  Carolyn Whetzel, Federal Court Tosses Out Nuisance Claim Filed Against 
Six Automakers by California, [2007] Daily Env’t Rep. (BNA) No. 2,036 (Sept. 21, 2007). 
38  See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (2006). 
39  42 U.S.C. § 9614 (a) (2006). 
40  See ALAN DERICKSON, BLACK LUNG: ANATOMY OF A PUBLIC HEALTH DISASTER 143–82 (1998); 
Paul D. Carrington, Asbestos Lessons, the Consequences of Asbestos Litigation, 26 REV. LITIG. 583, 596 
(2007). 
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abate as many future harms as possible, and should do so.41  Just as 
CERCLA evidences a choice through remediation to effectively insulate 
people from future harm,42 climate change legislation should spend money 
to abate as many future effects of climate change as possible.  This is con-
sistent with our common law principles of fairness,43 particularly if the leg-
islation might have any preemptive effect. 
Initially, when businesses first began to support the idea of comprehen-
sive climate change legislation, it was with the hope that federal legislation 
would preempt the patchwork of state and local initiatives that were being 
enacted.44  However, many environmental organizations oppose the pre-
emption of local initiatives,45 and point to past environmental laws as ex-
amples of cooperative federalism that allow a national floor for emissions 
but permit the states to go above that floor.46  This is why a comparison to 
principle in prior laws is so important: explicit preemption seems particu-
larly at odds with fairness concerns evident in prior environmental laws 
such as CERCLA.47 
Legislation should also take care to avoid implicit preemption if some 
compensation or protection scheme is not enacted.  None of the current bills 
explicitly preempt state programs or state common law, and Senator Boxer 
has gone on record as opposing any state preemption provisions.48  How-
ever, the Bingaman-Specter bill includes a provision for financial assistance 
to those specifically affected by climate change, with particular provisions 
governing the state of Alaska, and it is possible that implicit preemption of 
common law might be read into this.  
The issue of compensation for harms or adaptation has not been ad-
dressed in the goals section of the proposed statutes, though the Lieberman-
McCain bill would require a study on effects of climate change on the poor 
worldwide,49 and the Bingaman-Specter bill proposes financial assistance 
for coastal areas, natural resources, and Alaskan villages harmed by climate 
 
41  While controversial for other reasons, dikes and levees may lessen some of the harm for rising 
sea levels, while relocation of persons to areas less affected by extreme weather could also be done. 
42  Victor B. Flatt, This Land is Your Land: Our Right to the Environment., 107 W. VA. L. REV. 1 
(2004). 
43  Id. 
44  Economist.com, Business Calls for Carbon Caps, posting to Democracy in America, 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2007/03/business_calls_for_carbon_caps.cfm 
(Mar. 20, 2007, 21:30 GMT) (link). 
45  Congressional Bill Would Wipe out California Warming Law, Officials Claim, GREENWIRE, June 
6, 2007 (link). 
46  Though inconsistent common law actions may be prohibited by statutory schemes, the major 
statutes do allow the states themselves to set higher standards.  See ROBERT C. PERCIVAL ET AL., 
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 101–103 (5th ed. 2006).  
47  Flatt, supra note 42, at 21. 
48  Debra Kahn, California Regulators Say Cap-and-Trade Should Limit Free Credits, ENV’T & 
ENERGY DAILY, Oct. 9, 2007 (link). 
49  S. 280, 110th Cong. § 402 (2007). 
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change.50  The Bingaman-Specter bill is a good start, but any bill should be 
more specific about compensation rules and preemption, and should also 
address international assistance, even if it is simply to deny it.  One possible 
model for compensation for harms that can be specifically tied to climate 
change (such as the sinking of Alaskan villages) would be to empower a 
special master, who could award funds based on specific criteria, similar to 
the special master that awarded compensation from the September 11th 
Fund.51 
II. WHAT IS THE BEST METHOD OF REACHING OUR GOAL? 
The next question that must be addressed is how to best reach the goal 
that we have set.  Professor Rose discussed four broad methods to imple-
ment policy goals in environmental legislation, which she colloquially re-
fers to as “do-nothing,” “keepout,” “rightway,” and “property.”52  
“Rightway” has sometimes been characterized as command and control and 
“property” may also be identified as market mechanisms; moreover, other 
thinkers and writers may further divide and clarify policy implementation 
devices, such as feasibility or education.53  The pluses and minuses of each 
of these methods have been explored and debated, and sometimes they are 
linked to what the ultimate goal of the regulation should be.54 
A. Is A Market-Based System Best? 
Interestingly all of the climate change legislative proposals would be 
considered market-based control regimes, with Bingaman-Specter, Udall-
Petri, Lieberman-McCain, Kerry-Snowe, Waxman, Feinstein-Carper, and 
Alexander-Lieberman, all envisioning a cap-and-trade scheme for CO2, and 
Stark and Larson proposing an economy wide tax. 
A tax system can control pollution by setting a tax on emissions (such 
as for CO2) at a high enough level to discourage such emissions.  For in-
stance, one could presumably set a tax on CO2 emissions (or energy produc-
tion associated with CO2 emissions) that would discourage emissions 
enough to reach a CO2 reduction target.  Cap-and-trade systems adopt the 
target first and then allocate the overall amount allowed by the target to par-
 
50  S. 1766, 110th Cong. § 402 (2007). 
51  See James Harris, Comment, Why the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund Provides the 
Case for a New Zealand-Style Comprehensive Social Insurance Plan in the United States, 100 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1367, 1400 (2006) (link). 
52  Carol M. Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls: Management Strategies for Common Re-
sources, 1991 DUKE L.J. 1, 9 (1991). 
53  For example, Professor Driesen has been quite successful in noting that “feasibility” is a policy 
implementation mechanism separate from others.  See David M. Driesen, Distributing the Costs of Envi-
ronmental, Health, and Safety Protection: The Feasibility Principle, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Regula-
tory Reform, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1 (2005). 
54  See Rose, supra note 52. 
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ties in the market to use, sell, or buy (trade) as they please.  Cap-and-trade 
can be an efficient pollution reduction mechanism because the trading al-
lows the private sector to control emissions at the lowest possible cost (to 
the private sector) and also encourages innovation. 
Currently, none of our environmental laws attempt to control pollution 
through a tax and we have only one cap and trade system, the one for sulfur 
dioxide (“SO2”) to control acid rain that was passed in 1990.55  That all of 
the climate change legislative proposals embrace a tax or cap-and-trade sys-
tem shows just how much these systems have gained in respectability in the 
last seventeen years.  But there are disadvantages to such a system that in-
dicate the issue must be examined more closely. 
There are several good critiques of market-based systems to control 
pollution and comparisons of market based regimes, command and control 
regimes, and other regimes.  The primary critiques of market-based systems 
are that they may create hot-spots of pollution which hurt specific groups, 
usually the poor or politically powerless; that they are not fair because they 
do not necessarily penalize a polluter with the money to purchase pollution 
rights; that they send the wrong moral signals; and that they are difficult to 
enforce.56 
Of these criticisms, three do not appear to be of much concern when 
addressing the regulation of CO2 specifically.  Because CO2’s harm is 
worldwide and dispersed, there are no “hotspots” for concern.57  Moreover, 
concerns over moral signals seem lessened with CO2 as compared to almost 
any other pollutant because CO2 historically has not been seen as a “bad” 
thing, so producers are not said to have historically engaged in a bad behav-
ior.  Fairness is not as large a concern since all high-energy sector use usu-
ally has direct benefit to the general public. 
The enforcement issue, however, could be more important than the 
others for the regulation of CO2.  One of the unique features of the cap-and-
trade market in SO2, is that only large coal-fired power plants are involved 
in the market.  These are relatively limited in number, and already regu-
lated.58  Therefore, the enforcement and administration costs as well as the 
possibility of costs from regulatory failure are relatively low for the benefit 
that can be derived from the system.59  CO2 regulation would be a different 
animal altogether.  First, CO2 and other greenhouse gases are not limited to 
coal-fired power plants, though they are a major source.  Mobile sources 
 
55  See 42 U.S.C.§§ 7651c–7651m (2006). 
56  See CRAIG N. JOHNSTON, WILLIAM F. FUNK & VICTOR B. FLATT, LEGAL PROTECTION OF THE 
ENVIRONMENT 390 (2d ed. 2007); Victor B. Flatt, The Enron Story and Environmental Policy, 33 
ENVTL. L. REP. 10485, 10493 (2003) [hereinafter Enron]. 
57  Though collateral pollutants, such as mercury from coal-fired plants, will be affected by any 
change in demand and concentration of coal-fired power, and thus cap-and-trade systems could have 
collateral localized effects. 
58  See Enron, supra note 56, at 10,494. 
59  Id. 
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play a large role, and if a system were to include offsets (see discussion, in-
fra), the entities that must be monitored and regulated mushroom exponen-
tially. 
None of the legislative cap-and-trade proposals would subject every 
CO2 source to the market mechanism, but in such cases, significant sources 
that are left out of the system must still be regulated.  For instance Corpo-
rate Average Fuel Efficiency (or CAFE) standards for automobiles, which 
require an automotive seller’s fleet to have a certain fuel efficiency (which 
in turn reduces CO2 emissions) is an effective way of controlling CO2 from 
automobiles.  These have been debated in the related energy bill and should 
be part of the climate change solution.  Consideration of CAFE standards 
(or other method to control CO2 from cars, such as a tax) needs to occur at 
the same time as a consideration of any cap and trade proposal to see how 
much the relative reductions would cost and how the cost would be allo-
cated. 
Even if CO2 met all of the criteria necessary for the efficient use of cap 
and trade, some kinds of command and control, particularly those that man-
date the adoption of some market standard in certain sectors, can overcome 
commons problems and “split actor” problems60 and bring reductions at 
lower cost because of the ease of enforcement.  For instance, the EU con-
sideration on the ban of incandescent light bulb sales61 seems a very cost-
effective way to increase energy efficiency and thereby reduce the produc-
tion of CO2.  Thus, efficient reduction of climate-changing emissions might 
be accompanied by command and control systems, at least in some arenas, 
such as automobile design. 
In addition, a major nationwide survey demonstrated that a majority of 
the American public would actually prefer a command and control system 
rather than a market system to control climate change.62  The fact that this 
has not had a major impact on the legislative proposals to date suggests ei-
ther that the parties proposing the laws have a better sense of what regula-
tion will be effective, or those who propose the laws realize that market 
systems may not be as fair and effective but may benefit a particular fa-
vored industry or constituency—or some combination of the two.   
The difficulty with cap-and-trade enforcement may be why two of the 
proposals (Feinstein-Carper and Alexander-Lieberman) only apply to the 
electricity sector.  It has already been demonstrated that this sector can be 
efficiently regulated in a cap-and-trade system.  However, limiting the law 
 
60  Split actor problems refer to those situations in which a cost structure is set up so that the person 
who makes the buying decision is not penalized by the cost, e.g. the landlord who purchases the cheap-
est stove, even if its energy use is high and costs tenants more. 
61  See Helena Spongenberg, EU Could Ban Incandescent Bulbs, BUSINESSWEEK, June 22, 2007 
(link). 
62  See Peter Aldhous, Exclusive Global Warming Poll: The Buck Stops Here, NEW SCIENTIST, June 
23, 2007, at 16–19 (link).  There is also a preferance for a tax system to a cap-and-trade system.  Id. 
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to this one sector means that overall emissions reductions cannot be as 
large.63  Moreover, it raises fairness concerns.  While most Americans use 
electricity and would presumably share the cost of increases, the public at 
large will not see equitable distribution of costs to the extent that power 
plants have their rates set by inconsistent state regulation.64 
Feinstein-Carper and Alexander-Lieberman could be seen as compro-
mise proposals that anticipate further legislation in other sectors, but pro-
pose the electricity generation sector first because of the ease of regulation.  
Nevertheless, the very concept of proceeding in sectors raises concern.  
First, there is no guarantee that future legislation will occur after one sector 
passes.  Moreover, as discussed above, experience with cap-and-trade in the 
electricity generating sector may not be applicable to all industries, requir-
ing individual sector systems in any future legislation.  Sector-by-sector 
regulation might reduce cheating because trading within sectors will likely 
be easier to monitor, but the lack of inter-sector trading or offsets would de-
feat many of the benefits of a market system in the first place.  Economy-
wide proposals may be considered the most efficient and the most fair, but 
this consideration must be balanced against the enforceability of economy-
wide limits.65 
The enforcement problems inherent to a cap-and-trade system should 
spur a closer look at the legislative proposals that embrace taxation of CO2 
content.  Such taxes are easier to enforce than cap and trade because they 
are picked up at product and service origination and added to final prices.  
Economists generally favor a tax because it internalizes any efficiencies of 
a trading system (if the price of producing carbon is not recouped in one 
sector, it will cease production) without having to monitor a complicated 
trading system. 
The main objection to a tax system seems to be the belief that the 
American public abhors any “tax” and will punish any legislator who pro-
poses or votes for one, even if the tax is incorporated into final prices. 66  
Representative Dingell has recently challenged this assumption67, and I 
leave it to political scientists to further analyze this question and educate the 
public.  There is also some concern that the appropriate level of “tax” will 
not be selected to reach the intended reduction target, a problem that one 
need not worry about in cap-and-trade.  This is considered an economic sci-
ence problem, but a general aversion to taxes may mean that this “target” 
gets set by other considerations than the most efficient production of CO2.   
 
63  See SUMMARY OF BILLS, supra note 2. 
64  See David Cay Johnston, A New Push to Regulate Power Costs, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2007, at C1. 
65  See Darren Samuelsohn, Sanders Shifts Warming Debate With Power Plant-Only Bills, ENV’T & 
ENERGY DAILY, April 25, 2007 (explaining that Senatory Carper notes that some accomplisment in one 
sector is better than a stalled bill covering all sectors). 
66  David Leonhart, Auto’s Friend Shifts Tune on Climate, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2007, at C1. 
67  Id. 
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Nevertheless, because of ease of administration, a tax system is proba-
bly superior with respect to enforcement and fairness and could be tweaked 
to provide relief for the poor or others whom we feel deserve relief from 
regulatory impacts. 
B. How Should Cap-And-Trade Allocations Be Made? 
If a cap-and-trade system is chosen, legislators must choose how to 
best distribute the initial allocations that will be subject to trade.  Alloca-
tions for the right to emit carbon dioxide and equivalent greenhouse gases 
will be very valuable.68  There is already much jockeying for this windfall.  
Whether allocations are auctioned or given away will have little effect on 
the ultimate economic efficiency of the policy, since trade will efficiently 
allocate the allotments.69  But, this decision will have a large effect on the 
United States treasury, consumer prices, and distribution of costs. 
If a cap-and-trade system is ultimately chosen, it is imperative that CO2 
allocations be auctioned or sold, rather than given away.  Current industrial 
infrastructure has developed under a different legal regime, meaning that 
additional costs will fall heavily on sectors that rely largely on coal-fired 
power or utilize other fossil fuel generation, but the additional costs are not 
so large that they will completely disrupt an industry sector.  Electricity 
costs will rise in the South and Midwest, which depend heavily on coal-
fired power, but according to auction advocates, it should not increase more 
than 15%.70  Some of the money raised through an auction could be set 
aside to help low income persons who are hit especially hard by a price in-
crease in electricity or other staples of survival (shelter, food, and clothing), 
meeting the legislative goals of equity. 
If the right to emit CO2 is auctioned off, it will generate money for the 
US Treasury which could be used for spurring low carbon technology or 
other purposes.  However, this means that the cost of producing energy (at 
least for those whose energy production emits large amounts of CO2) would 
rise.  That likely will cost consumers more. 
Like a tax system, a cap-and-trade system that features allocation auc-
tions sends a better market signal and encourages all users to efficiently 
price the externalities of CO2.  It imposes the price hike more specifically 
on the industries that produce the CO2, which should send an economic sig-
 
68  The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the value of carbon allocations in a US cap and 
trade system could approach hundreds of billions of dollars.  See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, TRADE-OFFS 
IN ALLOCATING ALLOWANCES FOR CO2 EMISSIONS 1 (2007), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/80xx/doc8027/04-25-Cap_Trade.pdf (link).  
69  See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Majority and Supermajority Rules: Three Views 
of the Capitol, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1115, 1124 (2007) (link). 
70  CLEAN AIR WATCH, SHOULD BIG POLLUTERS OWN THE SKY?  THE DISTRIBUTION OF EMISSIONS 
PERMITS UNDER A FEDERAL GREENHOUSE GAS CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM (2007) (link). 
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nal to produce less of it.  An auction also avoids the need to decide whether 
to allocate credits based on CO2 production or based on energy output. 
If CO2 credits are not sold or auctioned, legislators must decide 
whether to allocate the credits based on energy output or historic CO2 out-
put.  Between the two, allocation based on energy output is preferable since 
it more accurately prices the externalities of CO2 producing activities and 
would tilt energy usage towards renewables and efficiency.  An allocation 
based on energy output would reward those who produce non-CO2 based 
power production but still cost consumers of CO2 intensive energy more, 
even without money going to the U.S. treasury.  An allocation based on his-
toric CO2 production, on the other hand, means that CO2 intensive energy 
producers will still be able to produce energy for the same cost structure as 
they have always done, which means that at least theoretically prices would 
not disproportionately rise in the CO2 intensive areas.  However, since CO2 
would still be rationed, the price of energy would still eventually go up 
overall.  It just wouldn’t rise as much in the CO2 intensive areas and 
wouldn’t affect the bottom line as much as those who sell CO2 intensive 
products (such as coal-fired electricity). 
As expected, the electric utilities that already consider themselves en-
ergy efficient, or those that produce power without fossil fuels, would pre-
fer either a carbon tax or an allocation based on energy production.71  Doing 
this imposes the cost of reducing CO2 on the largest producers of CO2 and 
puts the producers (and, by extension, the consumers) of non-CO2 generat-
ing energy or more efficiently produced energy at an advantage.  Those that 
have high CO2 production, such as coal-fired power plants, would prefer 
that allocations be distributed based on historic CO2 production.72  These 
producers cite the historic precedent with SO2 and the costs that would fall 
on the consumer if allocations are not “given” to coal producers.73 
Determining how to award allocations also implicates the difficulties 
of ascertaining information about CO2 production and energy production 
and setting a time baseline for making the allocations.  The time period the 
allocations are based on influences how we deal with prior CO2 cutbacks.  
For instance, credits awarded based on CO2 production in a time past (like 
1997) would temper the unfairness to producers who made voluntary reduc-
tions since that time—this would award them allocations that they can then 
sell.  This would also penalize producers who have created new CO2 
 
71  See Examining Global Warming Issues in the Power Plant Sector: Before the S. Comm. on Envi-
ronment & Public Works, 110th Cong. 2–4 (2007) (testimony of Lewis Hay III, Chairman, CEO, FPL 
Group), available at http://epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore 
_id=ac3ec28a-a579-4ef1-b840-faba432d7c11 (link). 
72  See Examining Global Warming Issues in the Power Plant Sector: Before the S. Comm. on Envi-
ronment & Public Works, 110th Cong. 8 (2007) (testimony of James E. Rogers, Chairman, President, 
and CEO Duke Energy Corporation), available at http://epw.senate.gov/public/ 
index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore_id=96b0a903-32fc-47f8-9a36-b4ddd9805e2b (link). 
73  Id. at 9. 
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sources for the sole purpose of capturing possible cap-and-trade allocation 
benefits. 
The economy-wide cap-and-trade legislative proposals seem to take a 
“cut the baby in half” approach to the question of allocation of credits, 
where some allowances are auctioned and others are awarded for free based 
on historic CO2 or energy output.74  The Bingaman-Specter bill, for in-
stance, initially gives out 53% of the allocations free to industry CO2 pro-
ducers (with reductions in later years), and reserves the rest to encourage 
low carbon coal development and for auction.75  Udall-Petri only gives 
away 20% of the credits, while the other economy-wide cap-and-trade pro-
posals (Lieberman-McCain, Kerry-Snowe, Waxman, and Sanders) leave the 
allocation decision to the EPA (with Lieberman-McCain providing some 
guidance on this decision). 
With respect to whether any free allocations will be based on historic 
CO2 production or energy output, the proposals currently tilt towards the 
historic CO2 production.  The Bingaman-Specter bill and the Udall-Petri 
bill (the only ones to address this legislatively of the economy wide bills) 
primarily allocate based on historic CO2 output.76  This is also followed in 
the Alexander-Lieberman bill, which only applies to the electricity sector.77  
The Feinstein-Carper bill, on the other hand, primarily allocates its credits 
based on energy output rather than historic CO2 production.78 
Many of the legislative proposals which envision a CO2 allocation do 
recognize the need to reward early reducers, with Lieberman-McCain bas-
ing allocations on 1990 production (the year of the Clean Air Act’s last ma-
jor amendment), while Boxer-Sanders and Bingaman-Specter choose 1992 
(the year of the Rio conference).79  The Kerry-Snowe proposal describes 
“reward[ing] early reductions” as a legislative goal, but does not specify a 
method to do this.80 
 
74  See July 2007 Climate Change Bills, supra note 2. 
75  See S. 1766, 110th Cong. § 201(a)(1) (2007), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_bills&docid=f:s1766is.txt.pdf (link) [hereinafter Bingaman-Specter 
Bill]. 
76  Id. at § 202(a)(1) & 202(a)(2). 
77  See S. 1168, 110th Cong. § 705(c) (2007), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_bills&docid=f:s1168is.txt.pdf (link) [hereinafter Alexander-
Lieberman Bill]. 
78  See S. 317, 110th Cong. § 716(b)(2) (2007), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_bills&docid=f:s317is.txt.pdf (link) [hereinafter Feinstein-Carper 
Bill].  
79  See S. 280, 110th Cong. § 103(c)(2) (2007), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_bills&docid=f:s280is.txt.pdf (link) [hereinafter Lieberman-McCain 
Bill]; S. 309, 110th Cong. § 704(f)(2)(B)(ii) (2007), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_bills&docid=f:s309is.txt.pdf (link) [hereinafter Boxer-Sanders Bill]; 
Bingaman-Specter Bill, supra note 75, at § 206(c)(2). 
80  See S. 485, 110th Cong. § 702(a)(2)(f) (2007) available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_bills&docid=f:s485is.txt.pdf (link) [hereinafter Kerry-Snowe Bill]. 
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It is surprising that whether allocation should be based on energy out-
put or historic CO2 output has not received more attention.  In many of the 
bills, it is difficult to determine which method is being used (some use 
terms such as “heat output” rather than CO2 or energy output), and the leg-
islative press reports do not focus on this distinction.  Even major environ-
mental organizations have been more likely to focus on the “safety valve” 
issue as the environmental bugaboo rather than the impact that allocation of 
credits based on historic CO2 emissions might have on encouraging clean 
energy.81  However, since this decision alone is worth billions of dollars to 
certain segments of the economy and since the initial distribution will have 
a large impact on how quickly consumers and industry turn to energy with 
lower CO2 production, this is a very important point.  Part of the tendency 
to award based on historic CO2 production may be a hold over from the use 
of the SO2 system as a model or a holdover from what was at one time be-
lieved to be politically feasible.  Closer examination of the costs and bene-
fits of the different allocation systems may push the American public 
towards a different conclusion.  
C. Offsets 
Any cap-and-trade system for CO2 must also address the question of 
offsets.  An offset is anything that will actually reduce CO2 production (or 
sometimes future CO2 production) at one location, which can then be cred-
ited against CO2 production at another location.  For instance, if a party has 
100 credits which allow the production of 100 tons of CO2, but wishes to 
emit 110 tons, instead of buying 10 more credits under the cap-and-trade 
system, that person might “offset” the extra ten tons of CO2 by eliminating 
ten tons of CO2 production elsewhere.  This could be done through retiring 
a source, creating a physical system to absorb CO2, or (more controver-
sially) avoiding an increase in future CO2 production by providing alternate 
methods of energy that do not produce CO2.  This is essentially a “pur-
chase” of offsets that takes place outside a cap-and-trade system. 
Offsets are very complex, but would add greatly to the efficiency of a 
system, allowing for faster and cheaper reductions.  They are also a mecha-
nism for transferring some of the benefits of compliance to developing 
countries.  The main concern with offsets is which ones should be allowed.  
Presumably, we wish offsets to actually do what they are intended to do.  
This means that any offsets will require proper measurement systems, veri-
fication systems, scientific consensus and consideration of possible unin-
tended consequences.  With respect to verification, the current state of the 
 
81  See Press Release, Environmental Defense, Bingaman Proposal Reflects Growing Support for 
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CO2 trading system in the EU is under critical evaluation.82  The EU has re-
cently discovered that its initial CO2 allocations and some offsets were im-
properly reported by the CO2 producers, which inflated the number of 
credits in the system.  Because the EU did not have any mechanism in place 
to verify what sources were actually producing, the system was improperly 
designed. 
Some proposals for carbon offsets may be scientifically suspect.  Bio-
logical carbon sinks, which—theoretically, at least—absorb CO2, are under 
increased scientific scrutiny and criticism83 because some, such as tree 
planting in the far northern hemisphere, may contribute to warming rather 
than offsetting it.84  Others, such as a plan to seed the ocean with iron fil-
ings near the Galapagos Islands to spur plankton, have been blasted as not 
being based on sound science, harmful, and motivated by nothing but 
profit.85  Lastly, offsets purchased in developing countries under the Kyoto 
Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (“CDM”) are not required to be 
sustainable or environmentally beneficial, and may only enrich the traders 
themselves.86 
Moreover, verifying trades and offsets can be a daunting problem.  It is 
difficult to track small sources, such as the CO2 from the 300 million auto-
mobiles in the United States,87 meaning that mobile source usage intensity 
will not be a reliable offset.  Offsets in foreign countries present particular 
difficulties.  The Kyoto Protocol’s CDM program which allows the pur-
chase of offsets in foreign countries,88 has been roundly criticized for the 
questionable validity of the offsets purchased.89 Creating an independent in-
ternational agency to vet international offsets, perhaps in conjunction with 
 
82  See Question Marks Over EU CO2 Trading Scheme, EURACTIVE.COM, June 29, 2007 , 
http://www.euractiv.com/en/sustainability/question-marks-eu-CO2-trading-scheme/article-155349 (link). 
83  See Critics Attack Offsetting Plan Near Galapagos Islands, GREENWIRE, Aug. 17, 2007, (link). 
84  See S.G. Gibbard, K. Caldeira, G. Bala, T.J. Phillips, & M. Wicket, Climate Effects of Global 
Land Cover Change, in GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS (Lawrence Livermore Nat’l Lab. 2005), available 
at http://www.llnl.gov/tid/lof/documents/pdf/324200.pdf (link); see also Gustavo A. B. da Fonseca, 
Carlos Manuel Rodriguez, Guy Midgley, Jonah Busch, Lee Hannah & Russell A. Mittermeier, No 
Forest Left Behind, 5 PUB. LIBR. OF SCI. BIOLOGY 1645 (2007), available at 
http://biology.plosjournals.org/archive/1545-7885/5/8/pdf/10.1371_journal.pbio.0050216-L.pdf (link). 
85  See Upset About an Offset, http://blogs.wsj.com/energy/2007/08/16/upset-about-an-offset/ (Aug. 
16, 2007, 16:37 EST). 
86  London Profits, While Africa Awaits Kyoto Benefits, REUTERS, August 13, 2007, available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/environmentNews/idUSL137011320070813 (link). 
87  Trading Foes Hail EPA Region IX Report Criticizing RECLAIM Program, INSIDE EPA, Nov. 22, 
2002, at 7. 
88  UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLEAN DEVELOPMENT 
MECHANISM, 
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/clean_development_mechanism/items/2718.php (link) (last 
visited Nov. 20, 2007). 
89  Press Release, Dag Hammarskjold Foundation, New Book Exposes Scandal of Carbon Trading, 
available at http://www.dhf.uu.se/documents/Press_release_carbon_trading.pdf (link). 
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the EU, may help ease international offset enforcement.  With respect to 
both international and domestic offsets, choosing limited, but heavily vetted 
offset possibilities, while having a mechanism to approve new offsets that 
“are in the public interest” is appropriate.  This legislative choice will drive 
lobbying and rent seeking for pet projects, but this may be the best alterna-
tive. 
Seven of the current legislative proposals, Bingaman-Specter, Udall-
Petri, Lieberman-McCain, Kerry-Snowe, Sanders-Boxer, Feinstein-Carper, 
and Alexander-Lieberman, specifically allow the use of offsets.90  The 
Waxman proposal does not specify the validity of particular offsets, but 
does state that the goals of a GHG reduction program should encompass 
“enhanced sequestration of carbon in the forest and agricultural sectors.”91  
The Stark and Larson tax system proposals do not allow offsets per se but 
do propose tax credits (which can be seen as an “offset” in taxes) for certain 
sequestration or GHG destruction projects.92  Therefore all of the proposals 
trigger the issues of concern with offsets. 
The Waxman proposal may have the virtue of simplicity, but simply 
encouraging “sequestration” in the “biological and agricultural sectors” pins 
the EPA, which would administer the program, into a system in which most 
of its research money would be spent in an area that is currently seen as less 
promising than originally thought, and which might thus be an inefficient 
way to reduce CO2.93  The Kerry-Snowe proposal has the same problem, as 
it tracks much of the language of the Waxman proposal, including invest-
ment in forest and agricultural sequestration (though it adds some other off-
setting goals as well).94  Focusing on a few offsets means that economic 
interests associated with those offsets may be benefited while we fail to re-
ceive efficiency gains from other offsets that are not favored in the statute.  
For instance, the Udall-Petri proposal embraces “unlimited” geological se-
questration offsets.  Though promising,95 these offsets, which anticipate us-
ing spent oil and gas fields to store CO2 underground, have not been fully 
tested, nor has the legality of title and usage (a traditionally state issue) 
been considered.  Lieberman-McCain addresses this issue by requiring that 
any credited sequestration be re-verified every five years, which is one way 
 
90  See SUMMARY OF BILLS, supra note 2. 
91  Safe Climate Act of 2007, H.R. 1590, 110th Cong. § 704(e)(5), available at 
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_bills&docid=f:h1590ih.txt 
(link). 
92  See SUMMARY OF BILLS, supra note 2. 
93  Press Release, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Plant a Tree and Save the Earth? (Dec. 
11, 2006), available at https://publicaffairs.llnl.gov/news/news_releases/2006/NR-06-12-02.html (link). 
94  Global Warming Reduction Act of 2007, S. 485, 110th Cong. § 702(a)(2)(E) (2007), available at 
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_bills&docid=f:s485is.txt (link). 
95  Darren Samuelsohn, DOE Finds Sequestration Capacity for 900 Years of CO2 Emissions, 
GREENWIRE, Mar. 28, 2007, (link). 
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to put a check on the system, but that bill also focuses too much on seques-
tration to the exclusion of other offset possibilities.96 
Since many potential offset sources have an economic interest in hav-
ing their offset approved either by law or regulation, we should be particu-
larly concerned with rent-seeking which is already part of the lobbying 
effort.  Sanders-Boxer leaves the determination of allowable offsets solely 
to regulatory decisionmakers.97  While this allows more flexibility with pos-
sible offsets and would also allow a system to recognize promising future 
offsets, simply putting the decision in regulatory hands does not always 
avoid undue pressure for approval of pet projects.  In fact, at the regulatory 
level, scrutiny of these choices might decrease. 
Most of the proposals that address offsets anticipate that any U.S. trad-
ing system will allow trading internationally.  Apparently because of the 
difficulty of enforcement in this arena, several of the legislative proposals 
(Bingaman-Specter, Lieberman-McCain, Feinstein-Carper, and Alexander-
Lieberman) cap the percentage of foreign offsets that any one producer can 
purchase.  Additionally, some (such as Lieberman-McCain and Bingaman-
Specter) have some system for verification of foreign offsets as well. 
D. Other Issues (Safety Nets, Research Grants, CO2 Equivalents, and 
Integration with Other Systems) 
1. Safety Nets—Another important consideration is whether legisla-
tion would have a mechanism for avoiding large increases in cost for CO2 
allotments.  Bingaman-Specter and Udall-Petri currently propose a “safety 
net” to protect American businesses from economic dislocation associated 
with introduction of a cap-and-trade system.98  CO2 safety nets usually set a 
maximum price for allocations in a cap-and-trade system.  David Mont-
gomery, vice-president of CRA International and former Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for Policy at the Department of Energy, suggests such a maxi-
mum price will protect those who are hit particularly hard by the newly in-
ternalized cost of CO2 production, and protect business from wild economic 
disruptions.99  Though controversial, safety nets have been proposed in 
some of the legislation, presumably to assist in legislative passage.100 How-
 
96  Climate Stewardship and Innovation Act of 2007, S. 280, 110th Cong. § 144(c)(5) (2007), 
avaiable at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_bills&docid 
=f:s280is.txt (link). 
97  Global Warming Pollution Reduction Act, S. 309, 110th Cong. § 704(b)(1) (2007), available at 
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_bills&docid=f:s309is.txt (link). 
98  See SUMMARY OF BILLS, supra note 2. 
99  CRA’s David Montgomery Talks Economics of Calif. Policy, Says Safety Valve Positive Tool, 
ENV’T & ENERGY DAILY News PM, June 19, 2007 (link). 
100  Katherine Ling, Bingaman Calls His CO2 Allocation a First Attempt, ENV’T & ENERGY DAILY, 
July 17, 2007 (link); Darren Samuelsohn, Lieberman, Warner Eye New Cost Proposal, Shy Away from 
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ever, there is also criticism of such safety nets as undercutting the effective-
ness of any cap-and-trade system.101  In addition to undercutting the effi-
ciency of a cap-and-trade system, such safety nets create another 
opportunity for certain industries to seek special favors in legislation.  Sena-
tor Boxer, chair of the Senate Environmental Committee, has indicated that 
she would not support any legislation that included such a safety net.  For 
their part, Bingaman and Specter have indicated a willingness to look at 
other options,102 and Lieberman and Warner have said they will not agree to 
add a safety net to their legislative proposal.103  However, many legislators 
seem predisposed to favor business relief as the cost of passing climate 
change legislation.104 
Bingaman-Specter and Udall-Petri also include provisions to offset 
“unfair” competition from countries, particularly developing countries, that 
do not limit CO2 production. There has been less attention paid to these 
provisions, and it is possible that they could be seen as encouraging foreign 
governments to implement binding cuts.  Whether this is appropriate from a 
“goals” point of view must be discussed in that context; as an effective 
mechanism for encouraging all countries to take their fair share of binding 
cuts, it may or may not be effective.  Though trade sanctions have been part 
of worldwide environmental treaties before, unilateral imposition raises 
questions of WTO violations.105 
2. Research and Development (R&D)—Grants for increasing techno-
logical solutions to climate change are prominent in the proposed legisla-
tion.  Many environmentalists and think tanks suggest that federal climate 
change legislation must include funds for alternative energy research, 
claiming that it is a necessary investment in order to make CO2 reduction 
less expensive, and there has already been significant research into tech-
nologies that might be particularly beneficial.106  As with any government 
grant, there is a significant risk that research funds will be spent improperly.  
As an example of the dangers of government research grants, ethanol incen-
                                                                                                                           
“Safety Valve,” ENV’T & ENERGY DAILY, July 25, 2007 (link) (explaining the tension surrounding the 
“safety valve” possibility). 
101  Darren Samuelsohn, Boxer Raises concern Over ‘Safety Valve’ Provision in New Bill, ENV’T & 
ENERGY DAILY, July 13, 2007 (link). 
102  See Ling, supra note 100. 
103  See Samuelsohn, supra note100. 
104  See Darren Samuelsohn, Senate Moderates to Propose “Cost Control” Bill as Addendum to 
Cap-and-Trade, ENV’T & ENERGY DAILY, July 24, 2007 (link). 
105  Steve Charnowitz, Environmental Trade Sanctions and the GATT: An Analysis of the Pelly 
Amendment on Foreign Environmental Practices, 9 AM. U. J. INT’L LAW & POL’Y. 751, 777–78 (1994) 
(discussing how some trade sanctions for environmental treaty violations would violate the precursor to 
the WTO). 
106  See, e.g., JA EDMONDS ET AL., GLOBAL ENERGY TECHNOLOGY STRATEGY: ADDRESSING 
CLIMATE CHANGE (EXECUTIVE SUMMARY) 21 (2007) (link). 
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tives have been lambasted for being wasteful, inefficient, harmful to the 
poor, and a farm-state giveaway.107 
Five proposals, Bingaman-Specter, Udall-Petri, Lieberman-McCain, 
Feinstein-Carper and Larson, provide for direct R&D grants.  In the cap and 
trade systems, these grants are to be funded from the money received from 
the auctioned portion of CO2 allocations.108  In the Larson tax proposal, six 
billion dollars of carbon tax receipts would go towards research and devel-
opment.109  The most striking aspect of these proposals is that, despite the 
abundance of free money on the table, there are few articulated standards 
for determining who should get this money, beyond the fact that it should 
contribute to a low carbon economy and be promising.  The Bingaman-
Specter proposal has the greatest level of specification.  It identifies specific 
categories, including coal-fired plant efficiency, zero emission electricity 
production, coal sequestration, cellulosic biomass, and lower vehicle emis-
sion technology, that may receive grants, and even specifies a rudimentary 
formula for the awards.110  Specificity about allowable R&D in legislation 
can be both good and bad.  With large amounts of money at stake, the pre-
identification of eligible technologies increases the probability of lobbying 
for financial gain at the expense of funding for the most scientifically prom-
ising technologies.111  However, if no specifications are set out for adminis-
tratively awarding such grants, the award of the grants becomes a goal in 
itself, rather than necessarily being an efficient way to encourage innova-
tion. 
There are political and economic arguments about whether direct 
grants really do good or whether these issues should be left to the market-
place.  The popularity of R&D among most factions supporting climate 
change legislation, however, seems to indicate that it will be part of a com-
prehensive scheme.  R&D which benefits certain areas of the country may 
also be the necessary political “pork” to grease the wheels of Congressional 
voting.112 
 
107  Jack Lyne, Ethanol Incentives: Fueling a Boon or a Boondoggle?, SITE SELECTION, Aug. 2007, 
http://www.siteselection.com/ssinsider/incentive/ti0708.htm (link).  For a more detailed discussion of 
the problems associated with ethanol incentives (including marketplace distortion, environmental harms, 
energy inefficiency, and food security) see L. Leon Geyer, Phillip Chong, & Bill Hxue, Ethanol, Bio-
mass, Biofuels and Energy: a Profile and Overview, 12 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 61, 72, 74–76 (2007). 
108  See SUMMARY OF BILLS, supra note 2. 
109  Id. 
110  Low Carbon Economy Act of 2007, S. 1766, 110th Cong. § 401 (2007), available at 
http://energy.senate.gov/public/_files/END07842_xml1.pdf (link). 
111  For example, the much touted hydrogen car in President Bush’s 2003 State of the Union address, 
which has received large amounts of federal funding, is no closer to reality than it was in 2003.  Brett 
Clanton, So, When Do We Get Hydrogen Vehicles, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Sept. 5, 2007, at A1. 
112  Alaska has already received funding for an International Arctic Climate Change Research Center 
for the University of Alaska Fairbanks, see Internatinonal Artic Research Center Homepage, 
http://www.iarc.uaf.edu/index.php (link) (last visited Nov. 20, 2007).   
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3. CO2 Equivalents—Another issue that has not yet been thoroughly 
explored in the current crop of proposals is the eligibility and handling of 
other greenhouse gases as carbon dioxide equivalents.  Overall, CO2 pro-
duces about 70% of global warming potential worldwide, but other gases, 
such as refrigerants and methane, are far more potent contributors.  The 
Kyoto Protocol and other major climate change policies have recognized 
this linkage, and the legislative provisions for the most part define a “Car-
bon Dioxide equivalent” uniformly: “For each greenhouse gas (other than 
carbon dioxide), the quantity of carbon dioxide that would have an effect on 
global warming equal to the effect of a unit of the greenhouse gas, as de-
termined by the President, taking into consideration global warming poten-
tials.”113 
While this seems direct enough, the details could get more compli-
cated.  Two issues in particular should be addressed: 1) should the green-
house gas equivalents be limited, and 2) how should equivalency to CO2 be 
determined.  The Bingaman-Specter and Lieberman-McCain proposals de-
fine “greenhouse gases” as only including carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous 
oxide, hydrochlorofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulfur 
hexafluoride.114  Waxman, Kerry-Snowe, and Boxer-Sanders, on the other 
hand, add another provision to the definition of “greenhouse gas” which al-
lows the administrator to designate additional greenhouse gases.  Though 
the Bingaman-Specter and Lieberman-McCain limitations of gases reflect 
allowable gas equivalents in the Kyoto Protocol, having the possibility of 
recognizing other gases maintains flexibility to identify other, more effi-
cient reduction possibilities. 
With respect to the second issue regarding equivalents, while Binga-
man-Specter says the CO2 equivalency will be “determined by the Presi-
dent, taking into consideration global warming potential,” Lieberman-
McCain (and other bills) simply allow determination by the administrator.  
While this may seem a distinction without a difference, the additional re-
quirement of taking into consideration global warming potential disallows 
consideration of other important factors.  Some reduction in greenhouse gas 
equivalents may have collateral dangers, while other may have benefits.   
For instance, by funneling money to offset more potent greenhouse 
gases that impact other environmental effects, the Kyoto Protocol’s CDM 
may be creating a market to allow more harmful gases to be sold for 
credit.115  But in developed countries, reductions of volatile organic com-
 
113  Low Carbon Economy Act of 2007, S. 1766, 110th Cong. §  3(2)(B) (2007) available at 
http://energy.senate.gov/public/_files/END07842_xml1.pdf (link). 
114  Id. at § 3; see also Climate Stewardship and Innovation Act of 2007, S. 280, 110th Cong. § 3 
(2007), avaiable at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_bills&docid=f:s280is.txt (link).  
115  Kyoto Projects Harm Ozone Layer: Ozone Official, REUTERS, Aug. 13, 2007, available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/environmentNews/idUSL137011320070813 (link). 
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pounds may also have collateral benefits in the reduction of ozone pollution 
and toxic air pollution.  This effect may be very large, and the related pro-
grams in the Clean Air Act should be examined in the formation of any 
climate change legislation to ensure that these benefits (and possible costs) 
are taken into account, or that the administrator can take them into account 
in determining various benefits of relative reductions in different green-
house gases. 
4. Relationship to other CO2 trading systems—Finally, the relation-
ship between any comprehensive cap-and-trade law and existing green-
house gas control systems must be analyzed.  Any trading or tax systems 
should be able to integrate with other verified CO2 (or CO2 equivalent) trad-
ing systems.  If the systems do not create an even playing field a conversion 
process can be established.  The same system can be implemented if usage 
in different sectors is not equivalent. 
Boxer-Sanders explicitly notes that verifiable state and local early re-
ductions shall be recognized, meaning that any reductions taken pursuant to 
the northeast greenhouse gas initiative will be valid.116  Lieberman-McCain 
takes a similar approach.117  Lieberman-McCain goes on to allow verified 
international trading allowances to satisfy 30% of allowable offsets, while 
the Bingaman-Specter bill allows the use of comparable foreign emissions 
credits to satisfy up to 10% of valid offsets.118  Kerry-Snowe and Waxman 
do not discuss state or international equivalent systems.  Our legislation 
need not slavishly follow another model and adopt its decisions on trading 
price or offsets, but we must consider how these programs will interact be-
cause this interaction will affect the success and efficiency of the programs. 
Other issues may be important in comprehensive climate change as 
well.  If energy legislation is considered, there could be many legislative 
provisions to encourage energy conservation.  With the costs of insurance 
rising due to climate change, the government may need to address the avail-
ability of insurance or re-insurance.  But the issues outlined above provide a 
fairly comprehensive model of concerns for climate change legislation. 
CONCLUSION 
None of the current legislative proposals encompass all of the best op-
tions for each of these policy considerations, but the major bills, such as 
Bingaman-Specter and Lieberman-McCain, could be altered to do so.  Big 
changes would require including an auction system (Stark proposes a 100% 
 
116  Global Warming Pollution Reduction Act, S. 309, 110th Cong. § 704(f)(2)(B) (2007), available 
at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_bills&docid=f:s309is.txt 
(link).  
117  Climate Stewardship and Innovation Act of 2007, S. 280, 110th Cong. § 3 (2007), avaiable at 
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_bills&docid=f:s280is.txt (link). 
118  Id. at § 144(a); Low Carbon Economy Act of 2007, S. 1766, 110th Cong. § 501(f)(2) (2007), 
available at http://energy.senate.gov/public/_files/END07842_xml1.pdf (link).  
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2007/32/ 149 
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW COLLOQUY 
auction), resetting the target reductions in accord with international agree-
ment, and establishing a binding target that is sufficient for harm avoidance 
(most studies suggest that at least a 50% reduction in annual CO2 produc-
tion from 1990 levels by mid-century is necessary to avoid the worst im-
pacts, but 80% may better approach our responsibility). 
Climate change legislation is complex; we cannot get by on vague calls 
for CO2 reduction.  The devil is in the details and the intent behind those de-
tails.  While the current legislative proposals address some of the issues as-
sociated with climate change legislation, none do so completely; and 
without examining all of the issues together, incorrect choices will be made.  
Armed with a checklist of issues, we can weigh the benefits and harms of 
current proposals and better tailor them to avoid climate change harms in a 
fair and efficient manner.  We may not all agree on necessary reduction lev-
els, acceptable harms, or what is fair or efficient, but a focus on the issues in 
this essay will make such discussions and decisions more transparent. 
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